Hannibal: A History of the Art of War Among the Carthaginians and Romans Down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C., With a Detailed Account of the Second Punic War by Theodore Ayrault Dodge

Author:Theodore Ayrault Dodge [Dodge, Theodore Ayrault]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Amazon
Publisher: Tales End Press
Published: 2012-08-03T03:00:00+00:00

To reach the Aufidus, Hannibal must turn the Roman position unobserved. This, by skillful and well-concealed movements and forced marches, he managed to do, reached Cannæ and seized it, with its abundant supplies. To judge by the topography and the roads then probably existing, he left his camp-fires burning at his camp near Geronium, and retired rapidly on Larinum, whence by Teanum Apulum, Luceria, his old stronghold, Æcæ and Herdonia, he reached Canusium and Cannæ. It is probable that there was a road along the coast, but this required the building of too many bridges for a rapid march. The Romans must pass by Bovianum and Beneventum to reach Æcæ; or from Beneventum the Via Appia would take them to Venusia, whence there was a road to Canusium. Once on the march, Hannibal’s cavalry could easily have prevented the Romans from interfering with his progress, even if they had tried. And after they discovered his departure, they did not guess his objective.

Not only had Hannibal provided himself with a storehouse full of victuals, but he had robbed the Romans of a fine town and magazine, in a section of country of great importance to whomever held it; and he had also placed himself between the Romans and much of the grain-giving section of Apulia, where the wheat earliest came to maturity. This afforded him every hope of compelling the enemy to give him battle.

The proconsuls, who appear to have still been in command until the new consuls should join, had been negligent indeed. They could readily have kept a sufficient garrison in the citadel of Cannæ, but this, little anticipating Hannibal’s turning march, they had not done. They could have kept watch on Hannibal, but so illy did they do this that they were scarcely aware of his breaking camp, and knew absolutely nothing of his direction, until they heard of the fall of Cannæ. No Roman could keep track of Hannibal. His marches were too rapid and secret. Thus suddenly deprived of their largest magazine, the proconsuls sent helplessly to the senate for orders, saying that they could not avoid battle if they followed up Hannibal, for he was in a level country, where they would be at the mercy of his cavalry.

It was Hannibal’s cavalry which so far had been his right arm in battle, his means of gathering rations. Without his cavalry be would have starved. Like Alexander, the Punic captain understood and utilized this arm as it deserved. It must not be forgotten that the dangerous zone of the weapons of the heavy foot was not over twenty yards from its front, and that cavalry could thus charge close up to a line of battle; while the farther carrying missiles of the velites were far from deadly to well-armed men. Small wonder that the enemy’s cavalry was the dread of the Romans, who had nothing wherewith to match it.

The proconsuls were instructed by the senate to await the arrival of the new consuls, for special reliance

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